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BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION: THE LIMITS OF
STARE DECISIS
Baseball, America's national sport, is followed religiously by
millions of fans in the ballpark, before their television sets, and on the
radio. While technology now allows the viewer to witness ball-field
action in his own living room, the law relating to professional baseball
is still mired in legal dogma dating to the crystal set age. Baseball's
anomalous exemption :from the coverage of the federal antitrust laws
has been unsuccessfully challenged by two recent cases, Flood v. Kuhn'
and Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs.2
The Supreme Court has characterized the Sherman Act as "a com-
prehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade."' In this spirit, the reach
of the federal antitrust laws has been interpreted to extend across the
entire spectrum of market activities.' Accordingly, the unique exempt
status conferred upon baseball by the Supreme Court in 1922° war-
rants careful scrutiny.°
The purpose of this comment is to determine the impact of
Salerno, Flood, and the earlier baseball decisions on the law-making
processes, and further, to examine the rationale utilized to exempt base-
ball from the purview of the Sherman Act. Finally, the propriety of
the Supreme Court's reinterpretation of statutes previously passed
upon will be considered.
I. THE Salerno AND Flood CASES
In Salerno v. American League, 7 two former umpires fired by the
American League charged the defendants with monopolization and
conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts. The trial court, dismissing the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, based its decision' upon two prior Supreme Court
1 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
2 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970).
a Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 4 (1958).
4 The scope of the antitrust laws now includes real estate, United States v. National
Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950); theatre, United States v. Shubert, 348
U.S. 222 (1955); and football, Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445
(1957).
5 Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
6 See Subcomm. on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Organized Baseball (1952). The subject of
baseball has attracted a large number of articles and comments. See generally Gromley,
Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 34 Neb. L.R. 597 (1955); Hoffman, Is the NLRB
Going to Play the Ball Game?, 20 Lab L.J. 239 (1969); Johnson, Baseball, Professional
Sports and the Antitrust Acts, 2 Antitrust Bull. 678 (1957); Comment, Monopsony
in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 Yale L.J. 576 (1953);
Comment, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the
Antitrust Laws, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 418 (1967).
7 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970).
8 310 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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rulings on the matter of baseball—Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
Inc. v. National League,u holding that baseball was not within the
Sherman Act's definition of interstate commerce, and Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc.," hadthat "Congress ad no intention of in-
cluding the business of baseball within the scope of the federal anti-
trust laws."1 '
The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal on the
grounds that even if professional baseball were subject to the antitrust
laws, the complaint failed to relate alleged antitrust violations to the
practices directed at the umpires.  However, Judge Friendly, speaking
for the court, acknowledged the dubiousness of Toolson, and the "un-
realistic," "inconsistent," and "illogical" distinction between baseball
and other professional sports." While admittedly critical of the earlier
cases, the court nevertheless insisted that the Supreme Court retains
the exclusive privilege' of overruling its own decisions." The Supreme
Court's recent denial of certiorari in Salerno" is unfortunate to the
extent that it reflects an unwillingness to deal with contemporary
political, social and economic developments. If the Flood decision
reaches the Supreme Court, perhaps the Court will take that oppor-
tunity to rectify baseball's anomalous antitrust exemption.
In Flood, the plaintiff, a professional baseball player, was traded
from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies on October
8, 1969. 13 Under the terms of the Uniform Player's Contract, Flood's
contract with the Cardinals could be freely assigned" to any of the
9 259 U.S. 200 (1922). The Court reasoned that "exhibitions of baseball . . . are
purely state affairs," and hence, not interstate commerce. Id. at 208.
10 346 U.S. 356 (1953). The Court affirmed baseball's exemption but side-stepped
a re-examination of the decision in Federal Baseball which held that the sport was not
a subject of interstate commerce. Toolson reasoned that "Congress has had the ruling
[Federal Baseball] under consideration but has not seen fit to bring such business under
these laws by legislation," and that the baseball industry had relied for thirty years upon
the assumption that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation. 346 U.S. at 357.
Toolson argued that if evils exist, Congress, if it chooses, should, by legislation, include
baseball within the scope of the antitrust laws.
11 346 U.S. at 357.
12 Judge Friendly commented that "we should not fall out of our chairs with
surprise at the news that Federal Baseball and Toolson had been overruled." 429 F.2d at
1005 (2d Cir. 1970).
13 Id.
14 400 U.S. 1001 (1971).
16 The defendants include the twenty-four major league baseball clubs of the
American and National Leagues and their presidents, and Bowie K. Kuhn, individually
and as Commissioner of Baseball.
Organized baseball consists of major league teams which comprise the American and
National Leagues and the minor leagues which are a subsystem of the major leagues.
No professional teams exist outside of this organization. Under the Major League
Agreement, all teams are subject to certain regulations and the powers of the Commis-
sioner of Baseball. 316 F. Supp. at 273.
10 All professional baseball players must sign the Uniform Players Contract which
includes an assignment provision. Also, Rule 9 of the Major League and Professional
Baseball Rules provides in part: "A club may assign to another club an existing contract
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major league clubs under a provision known as the reserve clause. The
reserve clause, enforced both by Baseball Rules and Regulations and
uniform contract terms,1T restricts the player to negotiating with one
and only one baseball club. In Mr. Flood's case, subsequent to October
8, 1969, he was restricted to playing for and negotiating with Phila-
delphia. The plaintiff alleged that the reserve system constituted a
conspiracy among the defendants to offer him only a single, uniform
contract, and that he was boycotted, in violation of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, from playing baseball for teams other than Phila-
delphia.18 The district court, relying on Salerno, found for the de-
fendants and directed judgment against Flood.
IL ANTITRUST EXEMPTIONS
Federal antitrust exemptions generally fall within two categories. 1°
First, a limited number of activities are expressly exempted from the
antitrust laws by statute. Certain agricultural" and fisheries 21 co-
operatives, for example, have been exempted by statute. Similarly,
labor unions have a limited statutory exemption from the antitrust
with a player. The player, upon receipt of written notice of such assignment is by his
contract bound to serve the assignee." 316 F. Supp. at 274 n.7.
17 Rule 3(a) of the Major League Rules and Professional Baseball Rules provides:
No club shall make a contract . . . containing a nonreserve clause . . . .
making of any agreement between a club and a player not embodied in the
contract shall subject both parties to discipline; and no such agreement, whether
written or verbal, shall be recognized or enforced.
316 F. Supp. at 274 n.4.
18 Flood also maintained in three other counts:
(1) that the reserve system constituted a violation of the antitrust laws of New
York, California and other states, (2) that the defendants, have restrained the
plaintiff's free exercise of playing professional baseball in violation of the com-
mon law, and (3) that the reserve system is a form of peonage and involuntary
servitude in violation of the anti-peonage and involuntary servitude statutes.
42 U.S.C. g 1994 (1964), 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1964), and the thirteenth amend-
ment.
Flood asserted three reasons why the court had jurisdiction to grant relief under the
Sherman Act. First, he contended that the Federal Baseball and Toolson decisions do not
bar the court from granting relief in light of the changing concepts of interstate
commerce. Second, he asserted that the reliance interests of team owners are not
violated in a request for prospective relief. Finally, he maintained that "the silence of
Congress since 1953 argues for, rather than against, a judicial reexamination of the
discretionary judgment exercised in Toolson." 316 F. Supp. at 272, 277.
The defendants relied heavily upon Federal Baseball and Toolson. They also main-
tained that the failure of Congress to legislate, in light of express invitations by the
Supreme Court to do so, signifies that Congress has decided not to change baseball's
status. Defendants further argued that professional baseball, unlike other league sports,
has developed in reliance upon the exemption granted by Federal Baseball in 1922. De-
fendants' Post-Trial Memorandum.
19 Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association, Antitrust Develop-
ments, 1955-1968, 215-16 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Developments].
20 Capper-Volstead Act, 7. U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1964); Cooperative Marketing Act of
1926, 7 U.S.C. §§ 451-57 (1964); and § 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
21 Fisheries Cooperative Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 521-22 (1964).
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laws under the Clayton and Norris-La Guardia Acts. 22 Finally, tele-
phone, gas and other utilities have long been allowed to operate as
monopolies at the price of government regulation." All of these ac-
tivities are excluded from the federal antitrust laws, however, by
specific legislation. Forthe most part, without the statutory exemption,
these activities would fall within the scope of the antitrust laws.
The second caegory of antitrust exemptions consists of those
activities which fall outside the scope of "trade" or "interstate com-
merce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. This non-commerce
category has steadily withered. 24 Today, football and other profes-
sional sports25 are covered by the antitrust laws as are other service-
oriented businesses." It is submitted that the baseball exemption is
unique because it does not fall within either the statutory or non-
commerce category of antitrust exemptions.
When the Supreme Court first considered the matter of organized
baseball in 1 92 2, 27 the Court held that professional baseball was im-
mune from antitrust attack because it did not constitute a subject of
interstate commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act. Today,
baseball is clearly engaged in interstate commerce. Whatever test is
utilized by the courts, whether for constitutional or antitrust purposes,
baseball's interstate contests and nation-wide television and radio
broadcasts place the business of baseball clearly within the confines
of the most stringent test of "interstate commerce." 28 Moreover, the
argument that baseball is a "sport" rather than a "trade" fails to
consider the multi-million dollar gate receipts and broadcast reve-
nues;" if it is a sport, surely it is also a business.
The Supreme Court has denied antitrust exemptions to the
theatre," to boxinel and to professional footba11. 82 The Court recog-
nized that few distinctions exist between baseball and these other
activities" but, nevertheless, chose to hold other sports within the
scope of the Sherman Act. However, the language in Radovich v.
National Football League" strongly suggests that but for the prece-
22 Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 17 (1964) and 29 U.S.C. § 52
(1964), and the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101-15 (1964).
28 See P. Areeda, Antite2ust Analysis, at 53-54 (1967).
24 See Antitrust Developments, supra note 19, at 215-16.
25 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) and United States v.
International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
28 See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485
(1950) (real estate); and United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955) (theatre).
27 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
28 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
29 League members may now, by congressional action, pool their television rights.
15 U.S.C. § 1291-93 (Supp. IV, 1969).
Bo United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955).
81 United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
92 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
88 Id. at 452.
84 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
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dent of Federal Baseball, the business of baseball would also be
covered by the Sherman Act." "In short," the Supreme Court observed
in United States v. Shubert, "Toolson was a narrow application of
stare decisis"88—not .a reaffirmation of an exemption based upon base-
ball's falling outside "trade" or "interstate commerce" within the
meaning of the antitrust laws. Given this reasoning, both Salerno and
Flood rejected changes in market structure since 1922 or 1953 as
academic. Therefore, it is no longer seriously contested that organized
baseball does not constitute "trade" or that it is not engaged in "inter-
state commerce."
While the language of Toolson relates back to the earlier Federal
Baseball decision, it represented a new approach in upholding base-
ball's exemption. Thus, the Toolson opinion has generally been inter-
preted to exclude the business of baseball on the ground that Congress
did not intend to bring baseball within the antitrust laws, as distinct
from the ground that baseball is exempt because of the lack of inter-
state commerce."
The Toolson approach presumes congressional intent to exclude
baseball from the ambit of the antitrust laws. Curiously, no explicit
statutory exemption exists, nor is any legislative history cited in either
Toolson or Federal Baseball to support this conclusion. Thus, the
Supreme Court was clearly straining to maintain baseball's exemption.
For the Supreme Court to uphold Federal Baseball, Toolson, and
now Flood, it would have to rely upon either of two arguments: first,
that congressional silence on the matter means that the Congress has
approved the earlier court decisions and has chosen to leave baseball
free from antitrust regulation, or second, that the reliance interests are
such that to overrule Toolson would create chaotic conditions in
organized baseball.
A. Congressional Intent to Exclude Baseball from the Sherman Act
Congress has been unwilling or unable to clarify the antitrust
status of baseball. While the legislative branch has neither modified
nor overturned the Supreme Court decisions on baseball, it has speci-
fically denied granting the industry congressional immunity from anti-
trust attack." One line of thought reasons that Congress has had the
rulings in baseball under consideration since 1922; it has refused to
act, therefore, Congress must approve of the decisions." In Flood, the
85 The Court commented, " . . . were we considering the question of baseball for
the first time upon a clean slate we would have no doubts [of including baseball within
the Sherman Act]. But Federal Baseball held the business of baseball outside the scope
of the Act." 352 U.S. at 452.
88 348 U.S. at 230.
87 429 F.2d at 1005.
88 See Subcomm. on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House COMM. on the
Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Organized Baseball at 230 (1952).
89 See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953); Radovich v.
National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1957); and Wisconsin v. Milwaukee
Braves, Inc., 31 Wls.2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966).
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trial court made this argument and suggested that congressional
silence may work to ratify the earlier Supreme Court decisions.
The argument against such an interpretation of congressional
silence was persuasively articulated by Justice Frankfurter speaking
for the Court in Helvering v. Hallock: 4°
It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping
Congressional silence to debar this court from re-examining
its own doctrines. To explain the cause of non-action by
Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture
into speculative unrealities. . . . Various considerations of
parliamentary tactics and strategy might be suggested as
reasons for the inaction . . . of Congress, but they would
only be sufficient to indicate that we walk on quicksand
when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation
a controlling legal principle.'
Thus, the Court in Hallock was reluctant to attribute any controlling
significance to congressional inaction. This approach sharply con-
trasts with the Court's reasoning in Toolson which rests, at least in
part, upon congressional approval inferred from legislative silence.
Later attempts to construe Hallock narrowly on the ground that
there Congress did not even consider the matter have proved unsuc-
cessful. Justice Black, dissenting in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local 770,42 unsuccessfully urged that once Congress
has considered the matter raised in an earlier decision and the legisla-
tive branch has not acted, then congressional silence indicates a will-
ingness to leave the decision' alone. In, Black's view, the Court's
reconsideration in Boys Markets of an earlier statutory interpretation
was tantamount to judicial legislation. The majority of the Court,
however, has followed the Hallock dictum that congressional inaction
is inconclusive. In Girouard v. United States," the Court stated that
"it is at best treacherous to find in Congressional silence alone the
adoption of a controlling rule of law!'" Further, in James v. United
States," the Court overruled a fifteen-year old decision, in spite of
legislative inaction. Similarly, congressional silence did not bar the
40 309 US. 106 (1940). In this case, the Supreme Court overruled an interpretation
of the Revenue Act of 1926 set forth in Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231 (1931),
Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935), and Becker v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 (1935).
41 309 U.S. at 119-21.
42 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See Note, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 295 (1970).
43 328 U.S. 61 (1946). Girouard overruled an interpretation of the Nationality Act
of 1940 set forth in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), and United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931).
44 328 U.S., at 69-70.
45 366 U.S. 213 (1961). In this case, the Court held that embezzled money is
taxable income to the embezzler under § 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.
§ 61(a) (1964), overruling CornrnicAloner v. Wilcox,. 327 U.S. 404 (1946), which had
excluded embezzled money froth gross income.
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Court from striking new ground in Boys Markets, although the
Congress had been urged to modify the earlier decision.
Underlying the majority-Frankfurter approach is the sound notion
that, given the realities of the legislative process, congressional silence
alone must be inconclusive. This view takes into account the multiple
possibilities which may have caused, the legislative silence: more im-
portant legislation may have occupied the time of the members, or, an
appropriate bill may have never been reported out of committee. The
Black view, by attempting to extract congressional approval out of
silence, is logically defective in that it insists upon a single conclusion
where others can be as readily inferred.
Application of the Frankfurter theory argues strongly for the
Court's reconsideration of the business of baseball from a more reli-
able reference point than mere congressional inaction. Flood-Salerno
is not dissimilar from Boys Markets'in that the Court is faced with a
situation in which Congress has refused to act despite its being urged
to do so." The Boys Markets conclusion that congressional silence
should not be interpreted as acceptance of an earlier decision is just
as applicable to baseball's antitrust exemption as it was to the labor
law issue decided in Boys Markets. If the Supreme Court should now
choose to overrule the Toolson and Federal Baseball decisions, appli-
cation of the Boys Markets principle that congressional silence is
inconclusive provides an avenue for reaching that result.
In sum, congressional inaction is too tenuous to tie the hands of
the Supreme Court. Further, the Court will not compromise our tri-
partite system of government if it prudently exercises the power to
overrule an earlier decision. It should also be noted that even if the
Court exercises such a power, Congress will retain final authority—it
can overturn the Court's reinterpretation by amendment of the statute
in question.
B.. Baseball's Reliance on its Exemption
Perhaps the most persuasive argument to maintain baseball's
exemption lies in the clubs' investments of millions of dollars in player
contracts, new franchises, and long-term leases subsequent to, and
purportedly in reliance on, Toolson and Radovich. Unlike the other
professional sports, only baseball has developed under the umbrella of
Federal Baseball. As the Court observed in Radovich, "[v]ast efforts
46 See note 10 supra, where it is pointed out that the Court in Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc., invited congressional action. The Court again invited congressional action
in Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). The Court there
acknowledged that distinctions between baseball and football were perhaps "unrealistic,"
"inconsistent," and "illogical." Nevertheless, the Court went ahead and made this
distinction inviting Congress to eliminate possible "error or discrimination."
This history compares with Boys Marketi, where the Court pointed out that the
Reports of Special Atkinson-Sinclair Committee, A.B.A. Labor Relations Law Section-
Proceedings 226- (1963), had urged, but failed' to obtain from Congress, a modification
of the Court's ruling in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. , .195 (1962).
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had gone into the development and organization of baseball since that
decision [Federal Baseball] and enormous capital had been invested
in reliance on its permanence."'"
It is highly speculative, however, to suggest that chaos would
result if baseball should be held within the scope of the antitrust laws.
The other professional sports have certainly grown and prospered
while operating without an antitrust exemption. The problem is
essentially one of molding appropriate prospective relief, not repeat-
edly throwing the matter back in the lap ,of Congress. It is within the
sphere of appropriate judicial action to 'apply such relief in light of
baseball's purported reliance.
III. APPLICATION OF STARE DECISIS
The Toolson Court rigidly adhered to the precedent set in Federal
Baseball and found that decision binding. In this respect, then, the
Supreme Court strictly, applied the judicial principle of stare decisis.
This doctrine, predicated upon the desire to achieve stability, pre-
dictability, and continuity in the law, seeks to provide judicial guid-
ance for private decision making; the public should be able to rely
upon judicial decisions with some degree of certainty. The Supreme
Court, however, has split over the question of the reinterpretation of
statutes—Justices Brandeis and Black opting for a rigid application
of stare decisis, while a majority, led by Justice Frankfurter, has
affirmed the power of the Court to review any of its own decisions.
For Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co.," upholding precedent was more important than correcting a rule
once it had been established. Supporting this position, Justice Black,
dissenting in Boys Markets, argued that any reinterpretation of a
statute by the Court violated the arena of congressional action and
usurped the legislative function. In the Brandeis-Black view, Congress,
unlike the courts, is in the unique position to respond to political
pressures and changed circumstances. "Having given our view. . . ,"
Justice Black maintained, "our task is concluded, absent extraordinary
circumstances. When the Court changes its mind years later, simply
because the judges have changed, in my judgment, it takes upon itself
the function of the legislature.") This theory suggests that it is
beyond the constitutional power of the Court to reinterpret statutes.°
Justice Frankfurter firmly rejected, the argument that it is out-
47 352 U.S. at 450.
48 285 U.S. 393 (1932). Justice Brandeis wrote, "Stare decisis is usually the wise
policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
waled than that it be settled right." Id. at 406.
49 398 U.S. at 258.
88 Justice Black maintained that reinterpretation of a statute is tantamount to an
amendment of the statute, and, therefore, constitutes a usurping of the legislative powers
of the Congress under Article I of the Constitution. However, he did not believe that
stare dedsis bars reconsideration of constitutional questions. Id. at 258-59.
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side the Court's power to reinterpret a statute. Speaking for the Court
in Hallock, Justice Frankfurter maintained that
stare decisis is a principle of policy not a mechanical formula
of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and ques-
tionable when such adherence involves collision with a prior
doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder,
and verified by experience."
The Frankfurter approach met head on the Court's responsibilities,
frankly reconsidering and overruling an earlier decision. The Hallock
language seems appropriate to the baseball line of cases because the
exempt status conferred upon the industry clashes with the "more
embracing" doctrine that the scope of the federal antitrust laws should
be interpreted broadly. Hallock illustrates the willingness of the
Court to reconsider an earlier statutory interpretation in order to
effect the purpose of the statute. 'Accordingly, baseball should be
considered in the light of contemporary interpretations of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts.
Recently, the Court again adopted the Frankfurter approach in
Boys Markets. The similarities pointed out above between Boys Mar-
kets, Flood, and Salerno call for similar treatment from the Supreme
Court. Thus, the baseball decisions, to the extent that they rely solely
upon the stare decisis doctrine, should give way to a new rule.
IV. SOME PROBLEMS WITH RIGID ADHERENCE
TO STARE DECISIS
Society has multiplied the things it expects governments to do.
Yet, as the baseball cases demonstrate, it remains quite unclear which
branch of the government should dO what. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly urged the Congress to make any changes it deems neces-
sary with respect to baseball, and thereby "correct" or modify the
Court's 1922 Federal Baseball decisiOn. This policy assumes that the
primary responsibility for correcting judicial "error" should be borne
by the Congress. But, the already overburdened Congress needs to be
free to deal with new problems, rather than merely correct the
"errors" committed by the judiciary. Standards of quality in decisional
law should be met by the courts irrespective of action or inaction by
the legislature.
Another undesirable consequence stemming from rigid adherence
to precedent is that it inherently confines decision making to the past.
Contemporary social, political, and economic values become sub-
ordinated to the thinking and response of an earlier age. Viable
government is built upon flexible institutions providing for the
accommodation of change. The judiciary cannot sidestep its responsi-
51 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
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bilities in this respect, particularly in cases such as baseball, where
the Supreme Court itself has been the source of the "inconsistency.'
A more damaging consequence derives from the weakened respect
for the legal system—a consequence which results from the Court's
decision to draw an irreconcilable distinction between baseball and
other professional sports. Why, one can reasonably ask, should one
sport and not others be given protection from the antitrust laws?
Whatever may be said about the policy of judicial reinterpretation
of statutes, failure to do so, as illustrated by the baseball decisions,
has led to a confused situation in both Congress and the courts. Thus,
when notions of stare .decisis lock judicial thinking into a 1922, or
even a 1953, legal framework, the law not only appears inconsistent,
but periodically the courts are again confronted with either compound-
ing the error or reversing a long-standing precedent. In light of the
foregoing problems, the Supreme Court should at least reconsider the
matter of baseball with a view towards weighing all the equities in-
volved.
CONCLUSION
Rather than recognizing the shaky 'rationale of earlier decisions
or changes in circumstances since 1922, the courts have instead urged
that Congress correct any error in baseball's exemption from the anti-
trust laws. Baseball serves to illustrate the price of strict adherence
to precedent. Distinctions between baseball and football, recognized as
"illogical" and "inconsistent" by the Supreme Court itself," have been
affirmed. The Flood and Salerno cases demonstrate that litigation does
not evaporate, and that dubious decisions of the past will periodically
haunt future courts unless sound logic is the cornerstone of judicial
precedents. Baseball's' antitrust exemption was originally predicated
upon the intrastate nature of its exhibitions. With Toolson, the
Supreme Court shifted the basis of the exemption to congressional
intent to exclude baseball from the ambit of the antitrust laws. It is
suggested that this was nothing more thin a mere rationalization. The
only rationale left for the present exemption is simply that forty-nine
years ago the Court held baseball not to be involved in interstate
commerce.
In conclusion, it is suggested that the Supreme Court follow the
lead of cases such as Boys Markets in which congressional silence did
not prevent the Court from overruling its own interpretation of a
statute. A flexible rather than static approach must be recognized by
the courts if social change is to occur within the context of con-
tinuity.
BARTON J. MENITOVE
52 429 F.2d at 1005.
53 Radovich. v.. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957).
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